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Second Price Auction One Bid Payment Tool

Single-unit sealed-bid second-price auction with explicit reserve and tie outcome.

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Description

Win only at or above reserve and above the highest rival, allowing equality when tieWins; a winner pays max(reserve, highest rival), otherwise zero.

Auction arithmetic depends on the bidding rule, reserve and treatment of ties. A payment formula for one supplied bid profile differs from determining optimal bidding behavior or operating an actual market.

Win only at or above reserve and above the highest rival, allowing equality when tieWins; a winner pays max(reserve, highest rival), otherwise zero.

When to use this tool

Use Second Price Auction One Bid Payment when you need an explicit auction-profile or benchmark bidding calculation.

How to use the tool and how it works

  1. Enter bid, rivalBids, reserve, tieWins. Use the units and conventions below.
  2. Run the tool. Correct any format, range, or cross-field input error before interpreting the output.
  3. Read wins, payment. Inspect wins before interpreting the associated values.

Require nonnegative own bid, reserve and a nonempty nonnegative rival list. Win only at or above reserve and above the highest rival, allowing equality when tieWins; a winner pays max(reserve, highest rival), otherwise zero.1

Input fieldMeaning and unitsAccepted input
bidBidRequired. Finite number; minimum 0.
rivalBidsRival BidsRequired. Array of finite number; maximum items 256.
reserveReserveRequired. Finite number; minimum 0.
tieWinsTie WinsRequired. Boolean.
Output fieldInterpretationReturned shape
winsWinsRequired. Boolean.
paymentPaymentRequired. Finite number.
json
{
  "input": {
    "bid": 10,
    "rivalBids": [
      6,
      8
    ],
    "reserve": 5,
    "tieWins": false
  },
  "output": {
    "wins": true,
    "payment": 8
  }
}

Limitations and assumptions

  • The zero payment can mean losing or a zero-price win; inspect wins. The caller supplies tie priority and this models a single-item second-price auction only.
  • Inputs must satisfy both the field types and the cross-field conditions above. Invalid input causes an error; a successful false flag or documented placeholder is a different result.
  • Numeric calculations use binary floating point unless exact decimal-integer arithmetic is explicitly stated. No hidden measurement tolerance or decimal rounding is added; nonfinite or out-of-contract results are rejected. Numeric signed-zero results are exported as zero.

Alternative or Complementary methods

Apply the complete auction specification and verify tie, reserve, allocation and payment rules. Use a model matching actual value and information assumptions before interpreting a theoretical bidding benchmark.

References

  1. Calculation and input contract: game-theory/second-price-auction-one-bid-payment — tool.io

Similar or alternative tools

  • Auction Second Price Gap

    Require at least two nonnegative bids, sort a copy descending, and return the top two and their difference.

  • Auction Reserve Equality Token

    Compare bid with reserve inclusively or strictly according to equalityAccepts and return bid minus reserve.