Description
Require at least two nonnegative bids, sort a copy descending, and return the top two and their difference.
Auction arithmetic depends on the bidding rule, reserve and treatment of ties. A payment formula for one supplied bid profile differs from determining optimal bidding behavior or operating an actual market.
Require at least two nonnegative bids, sort a copy descending, and return the top two and their difference.
When to use this tool
Use Auction Second Price Gap when you need an explicit auction-profile or benchmark bidding calculation.
How to use the tool and how it works
- Enter bids. Use the units and conventions below.
- Run the tool. Correct any format, range, or cross-field input error before interpreting the output.
- Read highest, secondHighest, gap. Use the output convention below.
Require at least two nonnegative bids, sort a copy descending, and return the top two and their difference.1
| Input field | Meaning and units | Accepted input |
|---|---|---|
| bids | Bids | Required. Array of finite number; minimum 0; maximum items 256. |
| Output field | Interpretation | Returned shape |
|---|---|---|
| highest | Highest | Required. Finite number. |
| secondHighest | Second Highest | Required. Finite number. |
| gap | Difference on the stated unit and subtraction basis. | Required. Finite number. |
{
"input": {
"bids": [
10,
7,
5
]
},
"output": {
"highest": 10,
"secondHighest": 7,
"gap": 3
}
}Limitations and assumptions
- Tied highest bids produce zero gap; the tool does not choose a winner, apply reserve rules, or conduct an actual auction.
- Inputs must satisfy both the field types and the cross-field conditions above. Invalid input causes an error; a successful false flag or documented placeholder is a different result.
- Numeric calculations use binary floating point unless exact decimal-integer arithmetic is explicitly stated. No hidden measurement tolerance or decimal rounding is added; nonfinite or out-of-contract results are rejected. Numeric signed-zero results are exported as zero.
Alternative or Complementary methods
Apply the complete auction specification and verify tie, reserve, allocation and payment rules. Use a model matching actual value and information assumptions before interpreting a theoretical bidding benchmark.
References
Similar or alternative tools
- Second Price Auction One Bid Payment
Win only at or above reserve and above the highest rival, allowing equality when tieWins; a winner pays max(reserve, highest rival), otherwise zero.
- Auction Reserve Equality Token
Compare bid with reserve inclusively or strictly according to equalityAccepts and return bid minus reserve.