Description
Compare strict stag-hunt risk-dominance products from supplied deviation losses.
Game-theoretic calculations depend on specified players, actions, payoff direction, probabilities and continuation assumptions. A single incentive term, coalition inequality or candidate best response is only part of a complete equilibrium argument. Supplied preferences and payoffs are model inputs rather than observed behavior or a moral allocation rule.
Compare strict stag-hunt risk-dominance products from supplied deviation losses.
When to use this tool
Use Stag Hunt Risk Dominance Payoff Product when checking the stated local payoff, strategy, matching or repeated-game condition.
How to use the tool and how it works
- Enter firstStagDeviationLoss, secondStagDeviationLoss, firstHareDeviationLoss, secondHareDeviationLoss. Use the units and conventions below.
- Run the tool. Correct any format, range, or cross-field input error before interpreting the output.
- Read stagLossProduct, hareLossProduct, stagRiskDominates. Inspect stagRiskDominates before interpreting the associated values.
Require four nonnegative unilateral deviation losses. Multiply the two stag losses and the two hare losses; stagRiskDominates only when the first product is strictly larger.1
| Input field | Meaning and units | Accepted input |
|---|---|---|
| firstStagDeviationLoss | First Stag Deviation Loss | Required. Finite number; minimum 0. |
| secondStagDeviationLoss | Second Stag Deviation Loss | Required. Finite number; minimum 0. |
| firstHareDeviationLoss | First Hare Deviation Loss | Required. Finite number; minimum 0. |
| secondHareDeviationLoss | Second Hare Deviation Loss | Required. Finite number; minimum 0. |
| Output field | Interpretation | Returned shape |
|---|---|---|
| stagLossProduct | Stag Loss Product | Required. Finite number. |
| hareLossProduct | Hare Loss Product | Required. Finite number. |
| stagRiskDominates | Strict product comparison; equality returns false without selecting hare as a unique winner. | Required. Boolean. |
{
"input": {
"firstStagDeviationLoss": 4,
"secondStagDeviationLoss": 3,
"firstHareDeviationLoss": 2,
"secondHareDeviationLoss": 2
},
"output": {
"stagLossProduct": 12,
"hareLossProduct": 4,
"stagRiskDominates": true
}
}Limitations and assumptions
- Equality returns false, not a unique alternative winner; payoff consistency and the assumptions of a two-equilibrium coordination model are supplied rather than verified.
- Inputs must satisfy both the field types and the cross-field conditions above. Invalid input causes an error; a successful false flag or documented placeholder is a different result.
- Numeric calculations use binary floating point unless exact decimal-integer arithmetic is explicitly stated. No hidden measurement tolerance or decimal rounding is added; nonfinite or out-of-contract results are rejected. Numeric signed-zero results are exported as zero.
Alternative or Complementary methods
Use the complete game, feasible strategy space and justified information/continuation assumptions for equilibrium, welfare or actual decision analysis.
References
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