Description
Return total contributions, retained private endowment, and private remainder plus coefficient times total.
Game-theoretic payoffs describe a chosen model of actions and incentives. A deviation, discounted term or local payoff contribution is only one part of the relevant equilibrium or welfare conditions.
Return total contributions, retained private endowment, and private remainder plus coefficient times total.
When to use this tool
Use Public Good Voluntary Contribution Payoff Term when you need one transparent payoff or incentive comparison.
How to use the tool and how it works
- Enter endowment, ownContribution, othersContribution, benefitPerTotalUnit. Use the units and conventions below.
- Run the tool. Correct any format, range, or cross-field input error before interpreting the output.
- Read totalContribution, privateRemainder, payoff. Use the output convention below.
Require nonnegative endowment, others' contribution and benefit coefficient, with own contribution between zero and endowment. Return total contributions, retained private endowment, and private remainder plus coefficient times total.1
| Input field | Meaning and units | Accepted input |
|---|---|---|
| endowment | Endowment | Required. Finite number; minimum 0. |
| ownContribution | Own Contribution | Required. Finite number; minimum 0. |
| othersContribution | Others Contribution | Required. Finite number; minimum 0. |
| benefitPerTotalUnit | Benefit Per Total Unit | Required. Finite number; minimum 0. |
| Output field | Interpretation | Returned shape |
|---|---|---|
| totalContribution | Total Contribution | Required. Finite number. |
| privateRemainder | Private Remainder | Required. Finite number. |
| payoff | Payoff | Required. Finite number. |
{
"input": {
"endowment": 20,
"ownContribution": 5,
"othersContribution": 15,
"benefitPerTotalUnit": 0.4
},
"output": {
"totalContribution": 20,
"privateRemainder": 15,
"payoff": 23
}
}Limitations and assumptions
- Benefit is linear and payoffs share a chosen unit. No equilibrium, external costs, participant behavior, or public-good valuation is inferred.
- Inputs must satisfy both the field types and the cross-field conditions above. Invalid input causes an error; a successful false flag or documented placeholder is a different result.
- Numeric calculations use binary floating point unless exact decimal-integer arithmetic is explicitly stated. No hidden measurement tolerance or decimal rounding is added; nonfinite or out-of-contract results are rejected. Numeric signed-zero results are exported as zero.
Alternative or Complementary methods
Evaluate the complete strategy space, timing and payoff model for an equilibrium claim. Test robustness to assumptions rather than treating a local incentive inequality as a prediction of actual behavior.
References
Similar or alternative tools
- Mechanism Budget Balance One Profile
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