Description
Test strict temptation>reward>punishment>sucker and separately 2×reward>temptation+sucker.
A two-action game can be represented by a small payoff matrix, but the interpretation depends on which player chooses each axis and whether their interests are opposed or coordinated. Indifference and a pure saddle are different conditions.
Test strict temptation>reward>punishment>sucker and separately 2×reward>temptation+sucker.
When to use this tool
Use Game Theory: Prisoner Dilemma Payoff Ordering Check when you need a stated two-action payoff identity or classification.
How to use the tool and how it works
- Enter reward, temptation, punishment, sucker, requireCooperationEfficiency. Use the units and conventions below.
- Run the tool. Correct any format, range, or cross-field input error before interpreting the output.
- Read result. Expand result to inspect the returned fields.
Test strict temptation>reward>punishment>sucker and separately 2×reward>temptation+sucker. accepted requires the strict ordering and optionally the efficiency condition.1
| Input field | Meaning and units | Accepted input |
|---|---|---|
| reward | Reward | Required. Finite number. |
| temptation | Temptation | Required. Finite number. |
| punishment | Punishment | Required. Finite number. |
| sucker | Sucker | Required. Finite number. |
| requireCooperationEfficiency | Require Cooperation Efficiency | Required. Boolean. |
| Output field | Interpretation | Returned shape |
|---|---|---|
| result | Object containing the calculated members; expand to inspect the fields below. | Required. Object. |
| result.strictPrisonersDilemma | Strict Prisoners Dilemma | Calculated result member: boolean. |
| result.cooperationEfficient | Cooperation Efficient | Calculated result member: boolean. |
| result.accepted | Accepted | Calculated result member: boolean. |
{
"input": {
"reward": 3,
"temptation": 5,
"punishment": 1,
"sucker": 0,
"requireCooperationEfficiency": true
},
"output": {
"result": {
"strictPrisonersDilemma": true,
"cooperationEfficient": true,
"accepted": true
}
}
}Limitations and assumptions
- Exact comparisons use supplied payoffs. This classifies a symmetric payoff pattern, not actual human behavior or every variant of a prisoner's dilemma.
- Outputs are nested inside result. Inputs must satisfy both the field types and the cross-field conditions above. Invalid input causes an error; a successful false flag or documented placeholder is a different result.
- Numeric calculations use binary floating point unless exact decimal-integer arithmetic is explicitly stated. No hidden measurement tolerance or decimal rounding is added; nonfinite or out-of-contract results are rejected. Numeric signed-zero results are exported as zero.
Alternative or Complementary methods
Solve the full game with its intended payoff conventions when equilibrium is the question. Check all best responses and feasibility conditions rather than inferring equilibrium from a single local equality.
References
Similar or alternative tools
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