Description
Multiply it by obeyPayoff minus deviatePayoff.
Game-theoretic payoffs describe a chosen model of actions and incentives. A deviation, discounted term or local payoff contribution is only one part of the relevant equilibrium or welfare conditions.
Multiply it by obeyPayoff minus deviatePayoff.
When to use this tool
Use Correlated Device One Obedience Term when you need one transparent payoff or incentive comparison.
How to use the tool and how it works
- Enter recommendationProbability, obeyPayoff, deviatePayoff. Use the units and conventions below.
- Run the tool. Correct any format, range, or cross-field input error before interpreting the output.
- Read obedienceContribution. Use the output convention below.
Require recommendationProbability in [0, 1]. Multiply it by obeyPayoff minus deviatePayoff.1
| Input field | Meaning and units | Accepted input |
|---|---|---|
| recommendationProbability | Recommendation Probability | Required. Finite number; minimum 0; maximum 1. |
| obeyPayoff | Obey Payoff | Required. Finite number. |
| deviatePayoff | Deviate Payoff | Required. Finite number. |
| Output field | Interpretation | Returned shape |
|---|---|---|
| obedienceContribution | Obedience Contribution | Required. Finite number. |
{
"input": {
"recommendationProbability": 0.25,
"obeyPayoff": 6,
"deviatePayoff": 2
},
"output": {
"obedienceContribution": 1
}
}Limitations and assumptions
- This is one unconditional obedience contribution, not a complete conditional incentive sum or a correlated-equilibrium verdict.
- Inputs must satisfy both the field types and the cross-field conditions above. Invalid input causes an error; a successful false flag or documented placeholder is a different result.
- Numeric calculations use binary floating point unless exact decimal-integer arithmetic is explicitly stated. No hidden measurement tolerance or decimal rounding is added; nonfinite or out-of-contract results are rejected. Numeric signed-zero results are exported as zero.
Alternative or Complementary methods
Evaluate the complete strategy space, timing and payoff model for an equilibrium claim. Test robustness to assumptions rather than treating a local incentive inequality as a prediction of actual behavior.
References
Similar or alternative tools
- Nash Deviation One Player Slack
Return its product with deviation minus equilibrium payoff, the opposite obedience slack, and profitable only for positive probability and strictly higher deviation payoff.
- Strategy Indifference Support Share
Sum all weight and weight whose payoff differs from reference by at most tolerance; return their ratio or flagged undefined zero.