Description
Multiply a congestion resource's user count by a supplied per-user cost.
Game-theoretic calculations depend on specified players, actions, payoff direction, probabilities and continuation assumptions. A single incentive term, coalition inequality or candidate best response is only part of a complete equilibrium argument. Supplied preferences and payoffs are model inputs rather than observed behavior or a moral allocation rule.
Multiply a congestion resource's user count by a supplied per-user cost.
When to use this tool
Use Congestion Resource Cost Term when checking the stated local payoff, strategy, matching or repeated-game condition.
How to use the tool and how it works
- Enter users, suppliedCostPerUser. Use the units and conventions below.
- Run the tool. Correct any format, range, or cross-field input error before interpreting the output.
- Read aggregateCost. Use the output convention below.
Require whole users>=0. Multiply by signed suppliedCostPerUser for aggregateCost.1
| Input field | Meaning and units | Accepted input |
|---|---|---|
| users | Users | Required. Safe integer; minimum 0. |
| suppliedCostPerUser | Signed cost already evaluated at the caller’s chosen congestion level. | Required. Finite number. |
| Output field | Interpretation | Returned shape |
|---|---|---|
| aggregateCost | Aggregate Cost | Required. Finite number. |
{
"input": {
"users": 12,
"suppliedCostPerUser": 3.5
},
"output": {
"aggregateCost": 42
}
}Limitations and assumptions
- The per-user cost is supplied at that congestion level; no cost function, externality, social optimum or equilibrium is calculated.
- Inputs must satisfy both the field types and the cross-field conditions above. Invalid input causes an error; a successful false flag or documented placeholder is a different result.
- Numeric calculations use binary floating point unless exact decimal-integer arithmetic is explicitly stated. No hidden measurement tolerance or decimal rounding is added; nonfinite or out-of-contract results are rejected. Numeric signed-zero results are exported as zero.
Alternative or Complementary methods
Use the complete game, feasible strategy space and justified information/continuation assumptions for equilibrium, welfare or actual decision analysis.
References
Similar or alternative tools
- Duopoly Firm Residual Demand Term
Calculate raw and nonnegative residual demand after rival quantity.
- Congestion Potential One User Increment Tool
One unweighted Rosenthal resource potential increment equals latency at usersBefore+1; latency is supplied, not inferred.