Description
Calculate each player's surplus over a supplied bargaining disagreement payoff.
Game-theoretic calculations depend on specified players, actions, payoff direction, probabilities and continuation assumptions. A single incentive term, coalition inequality or candidate best response is only part of a complete equilibrium argument. Supplied preferences and payoffs are model inputs rather than observed behavior or a moral allocation rule.
Calculate each player's surplus over a supplied bargaining disagreement payoff.
When to use this tool
Use Bargaining Disagreement Surplus when checking the stated local payoff, strategy, matching or repeated-game condition.
How to use the tool and how it works
- Enter firstPayoff, secondPayoff, firstDisagreement, secondDisagreement. Use the units and conventions below.
- Run the tool. Correct any format, range, or cross-field input error before interpreting the output.
- Read firstSurplus, secondSurplus, bothNonnegative. Inspect bothNonnegative before interpreting the associated values.
Return each payoff minus its disagreement payoff. bothNonnegative requires both payoffs>=their respective disagreement values.1
| Input field | Meaning and units | Accepted input |
|---|---|---|
| firstPayoff | First Payoff | Required. Finite number. |
| secondPayoff | Second Payoff | Required. Finite number. |
| firstDisagreement | First Disagreement | Required. Finite number. |
| secondDisagreement | Second Disagreement | Required. Finite number. |
| Output field | Interpretation | Returned shape |
|---|---|---|
| firstSurplus | First Surplus | Required. Finite number. |
| secondSurplus | Second Surplus | Required. Finite number. |
| bothNonnegative | Both Nonnegative | Required. Boolean. |
{
"input": {
"firstPayoff": 8,
"secondPayoff": 7,
"firstDisagreement": 3,
"secondDisagreement": 2
},
"output": {
"firstSurplus": 5,
"secondSurplus": 5,
"bothNonnegative": true
}
}Limitations and assumptions
- Nonnegative surplus is only an individual-rationality check, not a Nash bargaining solution, efficiency proof or fair allocation decision.
- Inputs must satisfy both the field types and the cross-field conditions above. Invalid input causes an error; a successful false flag or documented placeholder is a different result.
- Numeric calculations use binary floating point unless exact decimal-integer arithmetic is explicitly stated. No hidden measurement tolerance or decimal rounding is added; nonfinite or out-of-contract results are rejected. Numeric signed-zero results are exported as zero.
Alternative or Complementary methods
Use the complete game, feasible strategy space and justified information/continuation assumptions for equilibrium, welfare or actual decision analysis.
References
Similar or alternative tools
- Transferable Utility Core Coalition Slack
Check one transferable-utility coalition's payoff-allocation inequality.
- Payoff Affine Transform
Apply a positive affine transformation to one payoff.